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Intraday Herding on a Cross-Border Exchange 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates intraday herding on the Euronext, the world’s first cross-border 
consolidated exchange. Intraday herding is significant in the Euronext as a group and presents 
us with size, industry and country effects. Importantly, the trading dynamics of the group's 
member markets significantly affect each other and can, in the case of the Netherlands, 
promote herding formation. Intraday herding is found to be significant before, during and 
after the 2007-09 financial crisis period, with its presence appearing the least strong during 
the crisis. Overall, we demonstrate for the first time in the literature that cross-border 
exchanges harbour versatile herding dynamics at intraday level, a finding which reflects 
recent advances in financial technology and the ongoing financial integration in Europe.  
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1. Introduction  
Research interest in intraday herding has exhibited a notable surge during the past decade, 
motivated mainly by the fact that the daily or lower frequencies used by the bulk of herding 
studies preclude insight into the herding taking place within a trading session (Gleason et al., 
2004; Henker et al., 2006). In the contemporary financial context, where advanced financial 
technology allows for increased trading, both in terms of size (Aggarwal and Dahiya, 2006) 
and frequency (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013), establishing the presence of intraday herding is of 
key interest, more so considering the fact that herding itself tends to occur mostly within 
short horizons (Froot et al., 1992). Research on intraday herding (Gleason et al., 2004; 
Henker et al., 2006; Zhou and Lai, 2009; Blasco et al., 2011, 2012) has been conducted for a 
variety of national stock markets, with evidence to date appearing overall inconclusive. 
However, the onset of the globalization process since the 1990s has fomented cooperation 
among stock exchanges worldwide culminating in the formation of cross-border exchange 
groups, whose novel institutional settings offer a variety of services (trading; clearing; 
settlement) based on sophisticated technological infrastructure. It is interesting to note that no 
study to date has examined intraday herding (indeed, herding at any frequency) in such a 
group as a single entity (i.e. treating the group as a single market), despite the fact that cross-
border exchange groups constitute notably appealing settings for the study of intraday 
herding for two reasons. On the one hand, their technological sophistication can give rise to 
unique intraday trading dynamics at the group level (i.e. spanning across their member 
markets), thus suggesting the possibility of these dynamics leading to intraday herding at that 
level. On the other hand, recent evidence (Andrikopoulos et al., 2014; Economou et al., 2015) 
has denoted that merging into a cross-border exchange group leads to an increase in a 
market’s herding. Although these studies examine herding at lower frequencies (monthly and 
daily, respectively), the fact that joining a cross-border group constitutes an event capable of 
fostering herding in a market raises the question as to whether herding at the group level is 
also significant and what features it might entail.    
Our study investigates this issue for the first time in the literature by examining intraday 
herding in the Euronext, one of the first cross-border groups ever launched using an extensive 
dataset of nine years of tick data (January 2002 – December 2010) for all firms trading on 
Euronext’s four equity markets (Belgium, France, Netherlands and Portugal). We first 
investigate whether intraday herding is significant in the Euronext as a group and whether it 
is subject to the effect of established determinants (size, industry) of herding observed in 
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earlier studies on individual stock markets. Secondly, we explore whether a country specific 
intraday herding effect is present (i.e. whether intraday herding within a cross-border group 
varies in its significance across its member markets) and whether this effect is robust when 
controlling for the trading dynamics of the group’s other markets. Thirdly, we assess the 
effect of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, in view of evidence (Choe et al., 1999; Kim and 
Wei, 2002; Hwang and Salmon, 2004; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Mobarek et al., 2014; 
Economou et al., 2015) suggesting that crisis episodes constitute turning points in herding.  
From a theoretical perspective, herding relates to investors’ sidelining their private signals (or 
fundamentals thereof) in favour of imitating the actions of their peers following interactive 
observation of these actions (or their payoffs: see Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). Herding is 
often motivated by the anticipation of informational payoffs (Devenow and Welch, 1996), 
whereby investors discard their private information and follow the actions of those they 
believe to be better informed instead (because they consider these actions as informative). If 
free riding on the information of others becomes a widespread practice among investors, this 
can render the public pool of information poorer and promote the evolution of informational 
cascades (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). It is also possible that herding is driven 
by professional reasons, something particularly relevant to fund managers, whose 
performance is assessed regularly on a relative basis (i.e. versus the performance of their 
peers). In this case, managers of inferior ability are tempted to mimic the trades of their better 
performing peers in order to improve their image when their assessment is due (Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1990). A factor capable of giving rise to high correlations in the actions of finance 
professionals is the relative homogeneity (De Bondt and The, 1997) in their environment. 
This homogeneity can involve similarities in their educational background, the financial 
indicators they examine and the regulatory framework governing their actions1. Characteristic 
trading (Bennett et al., 2003), namely trading strategies (“styles”) basing the selection of 
stocks on specific characteristics (such as past performance, size and sector), is rather popular 
among fund managers and can also lead to similarities in their trades2. Recent research 
(Holmes et al., 2013; Gavriilidis et al., 2013) has grouped the above herding drivers into two 
                                                          
1 Restrictions on performance and stock selection imposed by regulators over pension funds in emerging 
markets lead their managers to trade the same (normally, top capitalization) stocks (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005).  
2 Funds following a particular style are likely to exhibit correlation in their trades as a result of benchmarking 
their investments against the same stock characteristic. For example, momentum trading funds will go long 
(short) on recent winners (losers), rendering it likely that several of the stocks they buy/sell will be the same.  
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categories, contingent upon whether the herding they generate is intentional or spurious. 
According to this distinction, the herding generated due to informational and professional 
reasons is considered intentional, as it is motivated by the anticipation of a payoff in 
situations characterized by relative asymmetry (more versus less well informed investors; 
better versus less able managers). On the other hand, relative homogeneity and characteristic 
trading are taken to promote spurious herding, in the sense that they lead to correlated trades 
as a result of commonalities (such as analyzing the same indicators or employing the same 
investment style) triggering similar responses among market participants, without imitation 
being present.3  
Empirical research on herding has been extensive during the past two decades, covering a 
multitude of stock exchanges across the world, with evidence produced from studies at both 
the micro level4 (using data on investors’ accounts/transactions) and at the market wide level5 
(using aggregate data, such as securities’ prices) being inconclusive. Herding has been found 
to be, on average, of greater magnitude in emerging markets, a finding that has been ascribed 
to these markets’ investors being less experienced and the informational environment being 
less transparent (Gelos and Wei, 2005). Size has also been found to be a determinant of 
herding, and in particular for stocks belonging to the two capitalization extremes, the largest6 
                                                          
3 For further evidence on intentional and spurious herding see also Galariotis et al. (2015, 2016b). 
4 Micro level herding studies focus on institutional and retail traders. Evidence in favour of institutional herding 
has been documented in Germany (Walter and Weber, 2006; Kremer and Nautz, 2013), Poland (Voronkova and 
Bohl, 2005), Portugal (Holmes et al., 2013), South Korea (Choe et al., 1999) and Spain (Gavriilidis et al., 2013), 
while Wylie (2005) found little evidence of herding among UK funds. Regarding US funds, earlier studies 
(Lakonishok et al., 1992; Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999) reported limited herding among them, with later 
research (Sias, 2004; Choi and Sias, 2009; Singh, 2013) finding their herding to be of higher magnitude. 
Evidence (Kumar and Lee, 2006; Dorn et al., 2008; Kumar, 2009) shows that retail investors also herd 
significantly.    
5 Evidence from market-wide herding studies suggests either the absence of herding (Christie and Huang, 1995; 
Demirer and Kutan, 2006) or is inconclusive (Chang et al., 2000; Caparelli et al., 2004; Goodfellow et al., 2009; 
Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Economou et al., 2011; Mobarek et al., 2014; Galariotis et al., 2015; Bernales et al., 
2016).  
6 The presence of herding for the largest capitalization stocks may be caused by either regulatory or structural 
reasons. An example of the former are the regulatory requirements for pension fund managers in emerging 
markets that restrict their opportunity set of stocks to their markets’ blue chips (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005). 
The latter refer to cases where funds’ performance is benchmarked to that of a market’s main index, whose 
composition fund managers may replicate in their portfolios to avoid deviating from the index-performance, 
ending up holding the same stocks – the constituents of the index – in the process (Walter and Weber, 2006).      
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(Wylie, 2005; Walter and Weber, 2006; Galariotis et al., 2016a) and the smallest7 
(Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999; Chang et al., 2000; Dang and Lin, 2016) 
capitalization stocks. Herding has also been found to vary in significance across industries 
internationally (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005; Choi and Sias, 2009; Zhou and Lai, 2009; 
Demirer et al., 2010; Gebka and Wohar, 2013), with this variation having been ascribed to 
several reasons (sector dominance8; risk aversion9; benchmarking10; fads11; style investing12) 
and being a function of market and industry specific conditions (Gavriilidis et al., 2013).  
Although the bulk of the above herding research has been conducted on the basis of data with 
a frequency ranging from daily to annual, recent studies have expanded the scope of herding 
research to the intraday level. This development is in line with the notion that herding often 
manifests itself as a short term phenomenon (Froot et al., 1992) and is part of a wider attempt 
to capture intraday trading dynamics (see the excellent review by Amini et al., 2013) in view 
of financial technology advances that have allowed for increased trading in terms of size 
(markets are able to absorb larger trading volumes) and frequency (latency has decreased 
immensely13). In this context, Gleason et al. (2004) found no evidence of significant intraday 
                                                          
7 Small capitalization stocks entail higher information risk, since their limited analyst coverage leads to less 
information being available about them. Investors focusing on such stocks could deem herding a viable option in 
order to counter this informational uncertainty (if they consider the trades of others to be informative).  
8 A possibility that has received some empirical support (Zhou and Lai, 2009; Gavriilidis et al., 2013) is that 
herding is expected to appear more pronounced in sectors dominating a country’s economic activity due to 
investors’ greater familiarity with those sectors and their fundamentals. As Gavriilidis et al. (2013) have argued, 
“bad” fund managers feel tempted to mimic their “good” peers when trading stocks of their economy’s 
dominant sectors, since any bad investments pertaining to the latter would suggest lack of understanding on their 
(i.e. “bad” managers) behalf of their home economy’s basics and would only help reveal their low ability. 
9 Herding would likely be observed more strongly in sectors entailing greater risk (reflected, for instance, 
through greater uncertainty in their cash flows - the case e.g. of the Technology sector), since investors would be 
expected to be more inclined to mimic others as a means of tackling that uncertainty (Lakonishok et al., 1992). 
10 The large number of funds (e.g. mutual funds, exchange traded funds) tracking specific sectors suggests that 
these sectors are likely to experience stronger herding as a result of those funds’ common focus. 
11 Some sectors exhibit more herding simply because they grow in popularity (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Choi and 
Sias, 2009); an example of this is the Technology sector’s bubble in the second half of the 1990s. 
12 Herding in a sector can be boosted by institutional investors i) momentum trading (by entering/exiting 
positions in/from sectors that have recently performed well/badly) or ii) switching sectors courtesy of style 
rotation (when adopting a new style that appears to be the best-performing at the moment; Choi and Sias, 2009). 
13 Latency is defined as the time lapsing between the submission of the order and its execution. As Hasbrouck 
and Saar (2013) note, contemporary financial technology allows for latencies as low as 2-3 milliseconds.  
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herding in a sample of US sector ETFs, while Henker et al. (2006) reported the near absence 
of intraday herding in Australia both at the market wide and the sector levels. Zhou and Lai 
(2009) found significant intraday herding in the Hong Kong market, whose significance was 
more pronounced among smaller stocks, during market downturns and on the sell side. 
Finally, Blasco et al. (2011) reported significant intraday herding for the Madrid Stock 
Exchange, with Blasco et al. (2012) documenting a strong contemporaneous linear 
relationship between intraday herding and volatility in that market.  
Nevertheless, the above studies on intraday herding have all been undertaken in the context 
of national stock exchanges and no study to date exists on this issue for cross-border 
exchanges, which are the products of the ongoing process of global financial integration. The 
onset of globalization since the 1990s with (i) the liberalization of international capital flows, 
(ii) the surge in international portfolio investments and (iii) the proliferation of cross listings 
(Aggarwal and Dahiya 2006) prompted national stock markets to transform their governance 
structures (demutualization)14 and enter into alliances with other exchanges internationally in 
order to seek synergies in areas (particularly those of business development and technological 
infrastructure) key in ensuring global competitiveness. This  consolidating trend has been 
gathering momentum since the late 1990s, culminating in the evolution of several regional 
(the Euronext, OMX and London Stock Exchange Group in Europe; the BRVM and BVMAC 
in Africa; the Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange in the Caribbean) and global (NYSE-
EURONEXT; NASDAQ-OMX) cross-border exchange groups. A key feature of each of 
these stock exchange groups is the presence of a single trading system which becomes 
operational via the group’s common trading platform. All stocks of the group’s members are 
traded on that platform based on a harmonized trading protocol whose design is outlined in 
the group’s uniform regulatory framework. These platforms comprise sophisticated 
technological infrastructure aimed at unifying trading, settlement and clearing across the 
                                                          
14 Demutualization involves the switch of stock exchanges’ governance model from mutual-ownership towards 
for-profit. Mutual ownership involves the participation of brokers-dealers holding seats in an exchange in the 
exchange’s shareholding-ownership with voting rights; in others words, trading rights and ownership are 
inseparable in this governance model. Demutualized exchanges are limited liability companies whose 
shareholders are not necessarily involved in trading. The first step towards its transformation from mutual-
ownership to for-profit is for the exchange to become a privately owned corporation. This is usually 
accomplished through the issue of shares and their allocation to members of the exchange, followed by (or 
coupled with) a private placement (where the exchange raises capital from its members and outside investors). 
The second step is for the exchange-company to go public and list itself on an exchange (very often, its own). 
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group’s constituent markets in order to provide favourable trading conditions characterized 
by low transaction costs, higher trading volumes and increased liquidity (Arnold et al., 1999; 
Pagano and Padilla, 2005; Nielsson, 2009). As the sophisticated financial technology of these 
platforms tends to reduce both the frictions in the trading process and the latency in the 
execution of orders, this renders the practice of any trading strategy more feasible, since the 
likelihood of investors being able to trade as many times within a trading session as their 
strategy requires, increases.  
Given that the above is expected to facilitate intraday trading, the issue arising is whether 
intraday herding exists in cross-border markets. From a theoretical perspective it is not 
altogether clear whether intraday herding in such markets should be significant or not, the 
more so given the lack of research evidence on this issue; to that end, we now turn to present 
possible theoretical justifications in favour and against the presence of intraday herding in 
cross-border groups. 
The case in favour of intraday herding in cross-border exchanges is founded on the following 
arguments. To begin with, these groups’ trading platforms are characterized by enhanced 
transparency, which can end up facilitating observation among investors, rendering it easier 
for them to imitate each other. At the intraday level, this will hold if some intraday traders 
learn to recognize the intraday trading patterns of other investors and use them as signals to 
herd on. It is also possible that intraday strategies generate correlated trades themselves, due 
to them either being programmed to focus on similar signals (those based on computer 
algorithms; see Sornette and von der Becke, 2011; Chaboud et al., 2014) or based on similar 
technical trading rules (the case of day trading). Also, as mentioned previously, earlier event 
studies (Andrikopoulos et al., 2014; Economou et al., 2015)15 have demonstrated that joining 
                                                          
15 Andrikopoulos et al., (2014) and Economou et al., (2015) compare herding in Euronext’s four constituent 
equity markets prior to and after their merger into the group. Andrikopoulos et al., (2014) measure herding at the 
monthly frequency for the January 1993 – October 2009 period and show that herding in Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands is significant (insignificant) following (before) these markets’ merger into the Euronext; no 
evidence of herding significance was detected for Portugal, be it before or after its entry into the group. 
Economou et al., (2015) measure herding at the daily frequency for the January 1990 – December 2012 period 
and show that herding in Belgium, France and the Netherlands is significant (insignificant) following (before) 
these markets’ merger into the Euronext; evidence of herding significance was detected for Portugal both before 
and after its entry into the group. Aside from examining herding at intraday frequencies (compared to the 
monthly and daily ones of these studies) our work differs from the above studies, since, instead of investigating 
the effect of Euronext-membership over herding in each of these four markets individually, it investigates 
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a cross-border exchange group (more specifically, the Euronext) has led herding to grow in 
significance in the group’s member markets. Although these studies examine herding at 
lower frequencies (monthly and daily, respectively), the significant herding documented in 
Euronext markets following their entry into the group suggests it is not unlikely that the 
group itself will also exhibit significant herding.  
The case against intraday herding in cross-border exchanges can be justified on the following 
arguments. On the one hand, the sophisticated trading infrastructure of such group is bound to 
enhance the participation of other sophisticated (presumably institutional) investors both from 
within and outside the group’s member markets, thus enhancing the heterogeneity of its 
investors’ base. Considering that the bulk of intraday trading is expected to be undertaken by 
institutional investors (as a result of the technological firepower and financial resources at 
their disposal), one would anticipate such sophisticated investors to trade based on their 
signals rather than imitate their peers. What is more, intraday strategies entail notable 
heterogeneity16 themselves, thus suggesting that their interaction should theoretically reduce 
the potential for intraday herding. Furthermore, the high transparency characterizing cross-
border exchanges should – again theoretically – encourage investors focusing on intraday 
signals to rely more on them and reduce their incentive to herd.  
In view of the above discussion, our study investigates intraday herding for the first time in 
the literature in the context of the Euronext, one of the first ever cross-border exchanges 
established internationally, following the merger of the equity, derivatives and clearing 
segments of the Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris stock exchanges on September 22nd 2000. 
The group expanded to encompass LIFFE derivatives market and the Lisbon stock exchange 
in 2002, while in 2007 it entered into a merger with the New York Stock Exchange 
culminating in the creation of the NYSE-Euronext group, currently the world’s largest 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
herding within the Euronext as a group (i.e. treating the Euronext as a single market), given the lack of prior 
work on herding in cross-border exchange groups as single market entities. This does not only allow us to gauge 
whether herding is significant in the Euronext as a group (i.e. a single market), but also whether herding in the 
Euronext at the group-level is subject to a series of effects widely established in the herding literature (size; 
industry) for national stock markets, while also testing for the presence of a country-effect (given that the group 
encompasses equity markets from four different countries).   
16 Algorithmic/high frequency strategies employed by institutional investors can involve market-making, 
arbitrage, directional trading, structural trading and manipulation (Hagströmer and Nordén, 2013), while day-
trading on behalf of retail investors based on technical rules further contributes to this heterogeneity.  
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exchange. In view of the research questions our study addresses that we outlined earlier in 
this section, our results indicate the presence of significant intraday herding in the Euronext 
as a group for the whole sample period and for both intraday frequencies (60-minute; 120-
minute) used, thus demonstrating for the first time that, beyond national markets, intraday 
herding is also evident in cross-border exchanges. We produce evidence in support of a size 
effect for both frequencies, with herding in the Euronext being significant among the highest 
and lowest capitalization stocks, yet not among middle capitalization securities. This is in line 
with extant literature’s evidence denoting that it is mainly the largest and the smallest stocks 
that are prone to herding. The presence of an industry effect is also documented, with herding 
being detected in specific sectors (Financials, Consumer Goods, Healthcare, Industrials, Oil 
and Gas, Technology, and Utilities), thus indicating that industry effects in herding are not 
only present in individual stock exchanges, but can be traced in cross-border platforms as 
well. We also present evidence of a country effect, showing that herding is significant in 
Belgium, France and Portugal, but not in the Netherlands, irrespective of the frequency 
employed to estimate it. These country-specific results are robust when controlling in each 
market for the effect of the remainder of the markets’ trading dynamics, with our results 
further suggesting that the four markets’ dynamics significantly affect each other. Perhaps 
more interestingly, we find that herding in a market can be motivated through the dynamics 
of other markets: this is the case with the Netherlands, where herding is motivated by the 
dynamics of the group’s other three markets in almost all tests. Finally, the onset of the 2007-
09 financial crisis appears to have had an adverse effect over herding, with the latter being 
the least strong during the crisis period (1st of June 2007 – 9th of March 2009) compared to 
before and after it, consistent with research (Choe et al., 1999; Hwang and Salmon, 2004) 
denoting a decrease in herding following the outbreak of financial crises. 
Our paper contributes significantly to the ongoing debate on herding, by providing evidence 
indicating for the first time that herding in a cross-border exchange group is a possibility and 
can entail qualitative features (such as size and industry effects) which have been to date 
widely reported for national stock exchanges in the literature. In view of the growing 
proliferation of such exchange groups internationally, our results point towards the need for 
herding research to devote more attention to them, in order to attain valuable insights into 
how herding manifests itself in these cross-border institutional settings. Furthermore, the fact 
that our evidence pertains to intraday frequencies contributes to our knowledge of intraday 
herding (particularly with respect to how the latter can be induced in a group’s market via the 
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trading dynamics of the group’s other markets, as is the case of the Netherlands in our study), 
given the relatively limited research on this issue to date. These results are of particular 
relevance to the investment community, especially with regards to investors with a global 
investment outlook. On the one hand, the commonalities reported for the Euronext markets 
(considerable presence of herding; significant intra-group dynamics) render investing in a 
group’s markets less beneficial in terms of international portfolio diversification. On the other 
hand, it is possible that the documented size, industry and country effects of herding can be 
utilized by investors for the purpose of formulating style strategies at the group level. These 
results are also of key interest to regulators in cross-border groups, since the latter’s common 
trading platforms can allow the transmission of intraday herding incidents across their 
member markets with potentially destabilizing effects.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
data and the methodology and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents and 
discusses the results and section 4 concludes by summarizing the paper’s key findings and 
outlining their implications for investors and regulators. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
In this paper, we use an extensive intraday dataset of all trades reported on Euronext’s four 
constituent markets (Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris) between January 2nd 2002 and 
December 31st 2010. The dataset has been obtained from Euronext N.V. and includes the 
following variables: exchange and instrument name, trade date and trade time in the nearest 
second, trade price, traded volume, currency and category type. The data on industry 
classifications are from the Thomson-Reuters Datastream database. We collect trades for all 
active, dead and suspended stocks to mitigate any survivorship bias in our results. We select 
equity trades only and drop trades that are not issued in the country that hosts the exchange 
and/or not denominated in Euros. We also delete half days and zero volume trades. Trading 
in the Euronext is conducted under the auspices of the French Nouvelle Système de Cotation 
(NSC), a hybrid trading platform and trading takes place between 09:00 and 17:25 (CET). In 
order to avoid any overnight and market closing effects, we drop the first 15 minutes and the 
last 10 minutes of the day which also allows us to create equal intervals during the trading 
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day. We construct two intraday intervals: 60 minutes and 120 minutes. The choice of these 
two frequencies rests upon the fact that the number of stocks with observable trades decreases 
as one moves to higher frequencies and we wanted the number of securities included in our 
testing intervals to be from as wide a cross-section of stocks as possible in order for our 
herding estimations to be meaningful. Hence, for each stock and at each interval we select the 
first trade of the interval and estimate returns between two consecutive intervals. If there is no 
trade at an interval, we assign a return of zero. 
 
2.2. Methodology 
The notion of herding being detected through the clustering of stock returns around the 
market’s consensus was first empirically formalized by Christie and Huang (1995), who 
proposed testing for herding using the following specification: 
 
CSSDm,t = α0 + α1DUP + α2DDOWN + et                                                                                    (1) 
 
In the above specification, Dt
UP (Dt
DOWN) assumes the value of one if market m’s return falls 
in the extreme upper (lower) tail of the market return distribution17, zero otherwise. CSSD is 
the cross-sectional standard deviation of returns and is calculated as: 
 
1
1
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)( ,,

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 

n
CSSD
n
i
t
rr tmti
                                                                                                      (2) 
 
In Equation (2), ri,t is the return of security i on interval t
18, rm,t is the average return of all 
securities (essentially, the average market return) during interval t and n is the total number of 
traded stocks in interval t. According to rational asset pricing (Black, 1972), the relationship 
between the cross-sectional dispersion of returns and the market’s absolute return is positive 
given the different sensitivities of stocks to market movements, with the return dispersion 
increasing as market returns grow in absolute size. The latter is expected to be observed 
                                                          
17 Christie and Huang (1995) identified extreme up (low) returns with the 1% and 5% of the upper (lower) tail of 
the market return distribution.  
18 As noted, we employ 60- and 120-minute intervals for our herding estimations.  
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mostly during periods of extreme markets, suggesting that such periods would be 
characterized by higher values of cross-sectional return dispersion (hence, α1 and α2 would be 
expected in that case to be positive in the above model). If, however, investors were to 
discard their beliefs in favor of the consensus and resort to herding, stock returns should 
cluster more tightly around the market average, thus leading to lower values for the cross-
sectional return dispersion; in that case, herding would be reflected in significantly negative 
values for α1 and/or α2.    
A key issue with the above specification is that CSSD, as Economou et al. (2011) pointed 
out, is susceptible to the presence of outliers; another issue is that (1) assumes a strictly linear 
relationship between CSSD and market returns. In reality, however, returns in the market can 
be so extreme, that this relationship turns out to be nonlinear (instead of the anticipated 
linearly positive one described above). Chang et al. (2000) proposed the following 
specification to test for the possibility of nonlinearities in this relationship: 
 
CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + et                                                                                         (3) 
 
The CSAD here is the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns (used here instead of 
CSSD to mitigate the impact of outliers discussed above) and is calculated as follows: 
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i
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          (4) 
 
ri,t is the return of security i on interval t, while rm,t is the equal-weighted market return (i.e. 
the market’s average19) during interval t. Equation (3) allows us to test for the significance of 
both the linear (reflected through |rm,t|) and the nonlinear (reflected through the r
2
m,t) part of 
the relationship between the cross-sectional dispersion of returns and the absolute market 
returns. Under rational pricing assumptions, α1 would be expected to be positive and α2 
insignificant; however, if herding grows in the market, α2 should be significant and negative. 
Equation (3) is used to examine the significance of herding in the Euronext as a group and 
whether it is subject to size, industry and country effects.  
                                                          
19 More formally, rm,t is calculated as 


N
i
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r
n
r
1
,
,
1
, where ri,t is the return of stock i during interval t. This is 
the equal-weighted average return of all n traded stocks in interval t. 
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Following Economou et al. (2015), we test whether the country effects are robust when 
controlling for the trading dynamics of the group’s member markets by employing the 
following modified specification of (3) in line with Chiang and Zheng (2010): 
 
CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + α3r2n,t + et                                                                            (5) 
 
In Equation (5), the squared return (r2n,t) of market n (n ≠ m) is included in the right-hand side 
to test whether (i) it interacts significantly with market m’s CSAD and (ii) its inclusion 
produces any effect over the herding of market m (i.e. whether it affects the significance of 
α2). A significant value for α3 would indicate an impact of market n’s dynamics over market 
m and if its sign is negative, then this would indicate that market n is capable of inducing 
herding in market m (Chiang and Zheng, 2010). 
Finally, to test for the effect of the 2007-09 global financial crisis on our results, we estimate 
equation (3) for each of the following three sub periods: pre crisis (2/1/2002 – 1/6/2007); in 
crisis (4/6/2007 – 9/3/2009); and post crisis (10/3/2009 – 31/12/2010). Based on 
Andrikopoulos et al. (2012), we identify the financial crisis’ window as the period between 
the peak of the Euronext 100 index on the 1st of June 2007 and its trough on the 9th of March 
2009. Choosing this period allows us to cover all major financial events starting with the 
suspension of the three investment funds of BNP Paribas on the 9th of August 2007 and up to 
the G20 summit in London on the 2nd of April 2009. 
 
2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents a series of descriptive statistics regarding our database. Panel A outlines 
some key statistical measures for both CSAD and rm,t for the Euronext as a whole and for 
each of its constituent markets for both frequencies (60-/120-minute) employed here covering 
the entire sample period (January 2nd 2002 – December 31st 2010). Table 1 shows that the 
average CSAD is higher for the 120-minute interval, a finding that is confirmed for all 
markets individually and the Euronext as a whole. Moreover, the volatility of CSAD 
increases as the trading frequency decreases. The highest values for CSAD are reported for 
the Netherlands, followed by France, Belgium and Portugal, indicating the presence of 
variability in the dispersion of returns across the group’s four markets. Panel B introduces the 
correlation matrix for the four markets’ CSADs for both frequencies and Panel C the 
equivalent matrix for all four markets’ rm,t. The matrices presented demonstrate that there 
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exists some positive correlation among the CSADs (rm,t, respectively) of all four markets 
which tends to increase progressively as the frequency decreases (i.e. as we move from the 
60- to the 120-minute frequency), while the smallest correlations in both matrices overall are 
observed for Portugal, the group’s smallest market. Panel D presents the number of firms 
corresponding to each market and sector (details on the construction of sector portfolios are 
included in the next section). 
***Insert Table 1 around here***  
3. Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Is herding significant in the Euronext as a group? 
We begin our empirical analysis by assessing whether herding is significant at the group level 
in the Euronext. Table 2 presents the results from Equation (3) using Newey-West consistent 
estimators for frequencies of 60 and 120 minutes for the January 2002 – December 2010 
period for the group as a whole. As the table shows, the values of the coefficient α1 are 
significantly (1% level) positive for both frequencies, indicating that the cross-sectional 
absolute dispersion (CSAD) of returns increases with the magnitude of the market’s return, a 
finding that is in line with the predictions of rational asset pricing models (Black, 1972). 
According to Chang et al. (2000), if herding ensues in the market, the relationship between 
the CSAD and the market’s return will become nonlinear and the presence of herding itself 
will be reflected through a significantly negative α2 coefficient. As Table 2 illustrates, this is 
indeed the case, since α2 appears significantly (at the 1% level) negative in all tests, 
suggesting that there exists significant intraday herding in the Euronext as a group.20 In view 
of the above, the results presented in Table 2 provide an affirmative answer to our first 
research question (i.e. whether herding is significant in the Euronext as a group), producing 
evidence for the first time of the existence of herding in cross-border groups. 
***Insert Table 2 around here***  
3.2 Is herding in the Euronext subject to the size effect? 
                                                          
20 For robustness purposes, we repeated our tests using the following modified specification of equation (3): 
CSADm,t = α0 + α1rm,t + α2|rm,t| + α3r2m,t + et (Chiang and Zheng 2010) with results confirming those reported in 
Table 2. Results are not included here in the interest of brevity, but are available upon request.   
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We next test for the possibility that herding in the Euronext is subject to the size effect. To 
that end (and in line with Chang et al., 2000), we sort the universe of listed stocks (i.e. from 
all four constituent markets) each year according to their market capitalization at December 
31st of the immediately preceding year21, split them into five equal-sized quintiles (quintile 1 
is the smallest, quintile 5 the largest) and estimate Equation (3) for each quintile. Results are 
reported in Table 3 and indicate that intraday herding is robustly significant (α2 appears 
significantly negative at the 1% level) for quintiles 1, 4 and 5 for both frequencies (see Panels 
A and B) and for the 120-minute frequency only for quintile 2 (α2 is significantly negative at 
the 5% level in Panel B for that quintile); no evidence of herding is found for quintile 3.22 
These results point towards the presence of a size effect in our findings, as they denote that 
intraday herding in the Euronext is detected among stocks of high- and low- (but not mid-) 
capitalization. These findings are in line with the aforementioned international evidence 
(Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999; Chang et al., 2000; Wylie, 2005; Walter and 
Weber, 2006) demonstrating that herding is most evident in extreme capitalization stocks. It 
is possible that our findings are related to the behaviour of different investor types when 
trading at the intraday level. For example, as high capitalization stocks are mainly held by 
institutional investors, who tend to employ intraday trading strategies, the presence of 
significant intraday herding for quintiles 4 and 5 can be attributed to the fact that these 
intraday strategies are often built around similar parameters in terms of indicators and signals 
(a reflection of the aforementioned relative homogeneity typifying the institutional trading 
segment), prompting those pursuing these strategies to exhibit correlation in their trades 
(spurious herding). Regarding quintile 1, which accommodates small capitalization stocks, 
typically held by retail investors, these market participants are often drawn to day trading 
motivated by behavioural factors (e.g. overconfidence), despite extant evidence indicating 
that excessive day trading proves detrimental to their wealth (Barber et al., 2014). With day 
trading strategies based predominantly on technical rules it is reasonable to assume that retail 
investors’ day trading relies on similar indicators, thus giving rise to the significant intraday 
herding documented for this quintile. Another possibility is that part of this herding is due to 
fund managers copying their peers when trading small stocks mainly due to informational 
reasons (see e.g. Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999). Whatever the case, the relatively 
                                                          
21 Data on year-end market capitalizations was obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream database.  
22 We have also repeated our tests using the following modified specification of equation (3): CSADm,t = 
α0 + α1rm,t + α2|rm,t| + α3r2m,t + et (Chiang and Zheng 2010) with results confirming those reported in Table 3. 
Results are not reported here in the interest of brevity, but are available upon request. 
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low volumes of small stocks would be expected to allow for a reduced expression of herding 
(they allow for fewer trades to be executed) compared to large stocks. Our results confirm 
this, with the values of α2 always being smaller (in absolute terms) for quintile 1 compared to 
quintiles 4 and 5, indicating that herding is stronger for large stocks as opposed to the 
smallest ones.       
***Insert Table 3 around here***  
3.3 Is herding in the Euronext subject to industry effects? 
With each sector entailing its own specific fundamentals to which all its constituent stocks 
are subject, it is possible that the trades of those investing in a sector will exhibit some 
measure of correlation (i.e. herding) in response to changes in its fundamentals. However, 
each sector’s fundamentals do not move in tandem with those from other sectors, thus 
suggesting that herding (assuming it exists) does not have to be simultaneously present in all 
sectors at all times. As a result, there exists no theoretical expectation for herding to be 
homogeneous across industries, nor has such homogeneity been documented internationally 
in the relevant literature either. Conversely, as our previous discussion in section 1 has 
outlined, there exists notable variety in the significance of herding across sectors 
internationally (i.e. herding manifests itself with industry effects that vary across markets). 
To test whether herding in the Euronext presents us with industry effects, we split all stocks 
listed in the group’s four constituent markets into ten industries23 and estimate Equation (3) 
for each sector for both frequencies. The significant herding reported in Table 3 for stocks in 
quintiles 1, 4 and 5, prompts us to expect that herding would also appear significant for those 
industries accommodating primarily stocks of the largest and smallest capitalisations. Results 
are reported in Table 4 (Panels A and B) and indicate the presence of significant herding (α2 
appears significantly negative at the 5% level) for the 60- and 120-minute frequencies (Panels 
A and B) in Consumer Goods, Healthcare, Industrials and Utilities and only for the 120-
minute frequency (Panel B) in Financials, Oil and Gas and Technology.24 No evidence of 
                                                          
23 The industries are: Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Healthcare, Industrials, 
Oil and Gas, Technology, Telecommunications and Utilities. The classification was based on the FTSE Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) categories.  
24 These results are robust when employing the following modified specification of equation (3): CSADm,t = 
α0 + α1rm,t + α2|rm,t| + α3r2m,t + et (Chiang and Zheng 2010). Results are not reported here in the interest of brevity, 
but are available upon request. 
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herding is detected in any of our tests for Basic Materials, Consumer Services and 
Telecommunications. Taken together, these results confirm the presence of industry effects in 
herding in the Euronext as a group. The fact that herding is significant in industries whose 
firms are traditionally ranked among the largest in capitalization terms (Financials, Oil & 
Gas, Healthcare and Utilities) is in line with the evidence presented in Table 3 on herding 
significance for the largest capitalization quintiles 4 and 5. With large stocks being popular 
among fund managers, it is likely that the herding observed in those sectors is motivated by 
institutional trades, possibly due to benchmarking25, more so considering the dominance of 
institutional investors in these markets.26 In line with the discussion in section 1, it is also 
possible that the herding identified here is due to the dominance of some sectors in the 
economies of Euronext’s member-markets, rendering these sectors’ fundamentals key in 
these markets’ trading. This is the case particularly for Industrials (accounting for just over a 
fifth of Euronext’s stocks – see Table 1), considering that Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands are strongly export-driven economies of industrial products. As for the 
Technology sector, a possible explanation for the significant herding detected there is that the 
sector is characterized by higher perceived risk, as it comprises mainly of growth stocks of 
rather moderate or small size (Gavriilidis et al., 2013). It is interesting to note that some of 
the sectors for which we have found herding to be significant have been identified as being 
susceptible to herding in other markets as well. This is the case with Financials in Hong Kong 
(Zhou and Lai, 2009) and Spain (Gavriilidis et al., 2013), Technology, Industrials and 
Consumer Goods in Spain (Gavriilidis et al., 2013) and Oil and Gas globally (Gebka and 
Wohar, 2013). 
***Insert Table 4 around here***  
3.4 Is herding in the Euronext subject to country effects? 
                                                          
25 This benchmarking may be either due to large stocks being constituents of blue-chip indices (which funds are 
assessed against in terms of performance and, hence track more closely) or to funds targeting the same sector. 
26 According to the FESE Share Ownership Structure in Europe 2007 Survey, the non-retail segment accounted 
for the bulk of market capitalization in Belgium (80.5%), France (93.3%) and Portugal (90.1%); regarding the 
Netherlands, said survey had no such breakdown of its capitalization, disentangling between domestic and 
foreign investors instead. However, with foreign investors shown in that survey to hold up to 80% of shares of 
Dutch companies, it is almost certain that this is a reflection of a heavy foreign institutional presence in the 
market, something further confirmed by Nielsson (2009).  
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In the context of a cross-border group it is possible that herding varies in its significance 
across the group’s markets and that herding in each of the group’s markets is dissimilar to the 
herding witnessed at the group level; in other words, it is possible that there exists a country 
effect in the group’s estimated herding. To explore this possibility, we estimate Equation (3) 
separately for each of Euronext’s four equity markets (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and 
Portugal) and report our results in Table 5. As the estimates in Table 5 indicate, herding is 
significant (α2 appears significantly negative at the 1% level) in all tests using both 
frequencies for Belgium, France and Portugal, yet not for the Netherlands.27 In view of the 
results in Table 2 denoting the presence of significant herding in the Euronext as a group, this 
suggests the presence of a country effect in the group’s herding, with herding being 
significant in some markets (Belgium, France and Portugal), but not others (the 
Netherlands).28 A possible explanation underlying this is the distinctively enhanced presence 
of overseas investors in the Dutch market compared to the group’s other three markets. As 
Figure 1 illustrates, whereas the participation of foreign investors in Belgium, France and 
Portugal hovered around 28-46% during the 2002-200729 period, the corresponding figures 
for the Netherlands were in the 67-80% range (FESE Share Ownership Structure in Europe 
2007 Survey). With foreign investors being institutional in nature, it is likely that the absence 
of herding in the Dutch market is due to it being dominated by sophisticated investors. It may 
also be the case that the global outlook characterizing the investments of foreign investors 
                                                          
27 As before, we have assessed the robustness of these results using the modified specification of Equation (3) 
(CSADm,t = α0 + α1rm,t + α2|rm,t| + α3r2m,t + et) proposed by Chiang and Zheng (2010). Results are essentially 
identical and are available upon request from the authors. 
28 These results are rather different to those reported by Andrikopoulos et al. (2014) and Economou et al. (2015) 
who found herding to be significant in the four Euronext constituent markets following their entry into the 
Euronext (with the exception of Portugal for Andrikopoulos et al. (2014), who detected no herding for that 
market after its inclusion in the Euronext). Of course, it is useful to keep in mind that, compared to our work, 
herding post-Euronext entry for each market was tested for sample windows ending in different time-points 
(October 2009 for Andrikopoulos et al. and December 2012 for Economou et al.) for these studies; what is 
more, the latter measured herding using lower frequencies (monthly and daily, respectively). 
29 We have not been able to trace data on investors’ composition in these markets post-2007. However, it is 
highly unlikely that the notably high figures of foreign shareholder-ownership changed in the Netherlands post-
2007, more so given the historically high participation of foreign investors in that market (see, for example, 
Nielsson (2009), who provided evidence denoting that foreign investors controlled around two-thirds of the 
equity volume of the Amsterdam market since the 1990s). 
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leads them to base their trades in any individual market on international asset 
allocation/diversification considerations, rather than herding towards that market’s consensus. 
***Insert Table 5 and Figure 1 around here***  
3.5 Is herding in each market member affected by the trading dynamics of the other markets? 
Membership in a cross-border group can lead to herding in one market being affected by the 
trading dynamics of the group’s other constituent markets, more so given the common 
platform linking all the markets together; this raises the issue of whether the previously 
documented country effect is  robust when taking these dynamics into account. Following 
Economou et al. (2015), we explore this issue using Equation (5), which is a modified 
specification of the Chang et al. (2000) herding model, incorporating the squared return of the 
group’s other member markets in a market’s herding estimations (Chiang and Zheng, 2010). 
Equation (5) is estimated for each of the four markets separately, for all possible 
combinations of markets.30 Results are presented in Table 6 and by and large confirm the 
evidence on the country effect previously reported in Table 5. Herding is again significant (α2 
appears significantly negative at the 1% level) in Belgium, France and Portugal for all tests 
while once more insignificant in the Netherlands for all tests. The α3 coefficient accounting 
for the effect of other markets’ dynamics on each market’s herding presents us with notably 
interesting results. As can be seen from Table 6, the values for almost31 all tests relating to 
the Belgian, French and Portuguese markets are positive and significant (α3 appears 
significantly positive at the 10% level), indicating that these three markets are significantly 
affected by the trading dynamics of their counterparts in the Euronext (without their herding 
significance being affected though, as discussed above). However, it is the results from the 
Netherlands that are most interesting in this regard, since, as Table 6 illustrates, almost all32 
                                                          
30 Equation (5) is estimated for each market including the squared return of each of the other three markets in 
turn (i.e. it is run three times for each market). For example, in the case of Belgium, we estimate this equation 
first by including the squared return of the French market only on the right-hand side, then by including the 
squared return of the Dutch market only and then that of the Portuguese market only.  
31 The sole exception here is observed for the Portuguese market when controlling for the dynamics of the Dutch 
market at the 60-minute frequency, where α3 is insignificant.  
32 The sole exception here is the test at the 120-minute frequency controlling for the Portuguese market’s 
dynamics, for which α2 is insignificantly negative. 
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α2 values are significantly (5%) positive, while the α3 values are almost all33 significantly (at 
the 10% level) negative. In line with Chiang and Zheng (2010), this suggests that herding 
formation in the Netherlands is not a function of the market’s domestic conditions (we found 
no such evidence in Table 5 either), but rather those of its peers in the Euronext.34 This is 
probably not irrelevant to the previous discussion, since the dominance of foreign investors in 
the Dutch market would be expected to render their investment decisions in the Netherlands 
more dependent on international market conditions (as opposed to domestic factors alone).35    
***Insert Table 6 around here***  
 
3.6 Does herding in the Euronext vary before, during and after the outbreak of the 2007-09 
global financial crisis? 
We finally turn to testing whether herding in the Euronext was affected by the global 
financial crisis in 2007-09. To that end, we estimate Equation (3) for the group as a whole 
before, during and after the financial crisis, in line with the sub periods defined in the 
previous section. Results are presented in Table 7 and they denote the presence of significant 
(α2 appears significantly negative at the 5% level) herding for all tests performed (before, 
during and after the crisis) for both frequencies tested. It is interesting to note that, in absolute 
                                                          
33 The sole exception here is the test at the 120-minute frequency controlling for the Portuguese market’s 
dynamics, for which α3 is insignificantly negative.  
34 According to the Chang et al. (2000) approach, herding in a market is reflected in the nonlinear relationship 
between the CSAD and the market’s return. If by adding the squared market return of other markets in a 
market’s herding equation we obtain significantly negative coefficients for that variable, then this suggests that 
herding in that market is induced by other markets’ dynamics as well.    
35 Whereas we find evidence of herding being induced in the Netherlands only by the trading dynamics of the 
other three Euronext-markets, Economou et al. (2015) document this to be the case for all four Euronext-
markets. Aside from the differences in sample window and frequency between our study and theirs, it is also 
worth noting that they tested for the effect of other member markets’ dynamics over each Euronext-market’s 
herding using the following specification CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + α3r2n,t + α4CSADn,t + εt (equation 6, p 
234). Essentially the difference between the two approaches hinges on the other markets’ CSAD on the right-
hand-side which we chose not to employ, as we wanted to focus on the interaction between market m’s CSAD 
with the squared return of market n (since this would indicate to us whether herding in market m is induced by 
the trading dynamics of market n). Nevertheless, for robustness purposes, we have repeated our estimations in 
Table 6 using their specification and find qualitatively similar results to the ones presented here, which are not 
reported for brevity reasons and are available upon request.     
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terms, α2 presents us with the highest values prior to the crisis’ outbreak and its smallest 
values during the crisis’ period. These results suggest that herding, albeit significant 
throughout the 2002-2010 period, appears less strong during the 2007-2009 crisis period. A 
possible explanation for this is that the outbreak of the crisis led to the unearthing of novel 
fundamentals for the global economy, prompting investors to rely more on them to inform 
their trading and less on the pre-crisis consensus (upon which the heavy pre crisis herding 
was founded). In view of the previously discussed differences in herding significance among 
the Euronext markets, we also estimate Equation (3) for each market for each of the three sub 
periods (before; during; after the crisis) and report the results in Table 8. Herding in France 
exhibits significance irrespective of the sub period examined, with α2 presenting us with its 
highest (smallest) values in absolute terms after (during) the crisis’ outbreak. Herding in 
Belgium is significant before and during the crisis only, with α2 presenting us with higher 
values (in absolute terms) before the crisis’ outbreak. Investors in Portugal herded 
significantly during and after the crisis’ outbreak, with their herding appearing stronger in the 
post crisis period (α2 bears higher values in absolute terms following the crisis’ outbreak). 
The results for Belgium, France and Portugal hold for both frequencies tested; it is also 
interesting to note that the Dutch market furnished us with evidence of herding significance 
during the crisis’ period for both frequencies. Overall, our results confirm the evidence 
presented so far on herding at the group level (significant herding in the Euronext as a group) 
and for each individual market (significant herding in Belgium, France and Portugal; near 
absence of herding in the Netherlands), while also indicating that the outbreak of the recent 
global financial crisis culminated in a reduction in intraday herding in the Euronext, a result 
consistent with research (Choe et al., 1999; Hwang and Salmon, 2004) denoting a decrease in 
herding following the outbreak of financial crises36. 
***Insert Tables 7 and 8 around here***  
4. Conclusion  
This paper investigates for the first time in the literature the presence of herding in a cross-
border market group on the premises of the Euronext, one of the first ever such groups 
formed internationally. Drawing on tick data from Euronext’s Trade-and-Quote database 
                                                          
36 For Tables 3 – 5 and 7, we have performed an F-test to test for the equality of α2 across size quintiles, 
industries, countries and before/during/after the crisis period, respectively. Results uniformly reject the null 
hypothesis of the equality of coefficients across regressions (these results are available upon request). 
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(TAQ) covering all trades conducted on all four Euronext constituent equity markets 
(Brussels, Paris, Amsterdam and Lisbon) between January 2002 and December 2010, we 
produce evidence showing that herding is significant in the Euronext as a group. Additional 
tests reveal that herding in the Euronext presents itself mainly for stocks of high and low 
capitalization and across several sectors, thus confirming the existence of size and industry 
effects. We also report evidence of a country effect, with herding being significant in 
Belgium, France and Portugal, but not in the Netherlands. This effect is robust when 
controlling for the impact of each market’s trading dynamics over the remaining three 
markets, with the exception of the Netherlands, for which we find the other three markets’ 
dynamics motivating herding. We attribute this finding to the fact that the Dutch market is 
overwhelmingly dominated by foreign investors, whose sophistication coupled with their 
global outlook would be expected to render their investment decisions in the Netherlands 
more dependent on international market conditions (as opposed to domestic factors). Finally, 
herding in the Euronext is found to be significant before, during and after the 2007-09 
financial crisis period, with its presence being the least strong during the crisis. 
Our findings present important implications for the investment community, particularly with 
regards to investors with a global investment outlook aiming to harness the benefits of 
international portfolio diversification. This is because the significant herding reported in this 
study for the Euronext suggests the presence of commonalities in trading dynamics within 
and across a cross-border group’s markets. Assuming an investor wishes to invest in markets 
belonging to the same group, these commonalities would be expected to reduce the 
diversification benefits from such an investment. On the other hand, however, it is possible 
that the documented size, industry and country effects of intraday herding can be utilized by 
investors for the purpose of formulating intraday style strategies at the group level. From a 
regulatory perspective, these results are also of key interest in the context of cross-border 
groups, since the latter’s common trading platforms can allow the transmission of intraday 
herding incidents across their member markets with potentially destabilizing effects.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Statistics for CSAD and Rm,t for each of Euronext’s constituent markets and Euronext as a whole 
 Mean Standard deviation Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis Number of 
observations CSAD rm,t CSAD rm,t CSAD rm,t CSAD rm,t CSAD rm,t CSAD rm,t 
Belgium               
60 minutes 0.390 -0.013 0.222 0.168 3.447 2.443 0.017 -3.643 2.187 -1.108 10.425 21.462 18,196 
120 minutes 0.497 -0.022 0.271 0.214 3.459 2.007 0.017 -2.913 2.012 -0.910 7.417 12.996 9,100 
France              
60 minutes 0.512 -0.014 0.234 0.182 3.081 2.633 0.001 -2.191 1.872 -0.857 6.839 13.598 18,181 
120 minutes 0.676 -0.025 0.319 0.247 3.563 2.869 0.155 -2.726 1.866 -1.191 6.209 13.294 9,092 
Netherlands               
60 minutes 0.603 -0.034 0.717 0.472 14.718 4.653 0.081 -8.014 6.799 -3.334 69.148 38.419 18,173 
120 minutes 0.826 -0.054 0.788 0.564 11.672 4.023 0.136 -6.626 4.932 -2.185 35.724 17.559 9,088 
Portugal               
60 minutes 0.414 -0.005 0.297 0.290 3.376 4.148 0.010 -3.477 2.473 -0.086 10.140 16.673 14,291 
120 minutes 0.577 -0.007 0.370 0.389 3.324 4.199 0.036 -3.768 1.908 0.017 5.669 12.935 7,150 
Total EURONEXT              
60 minutes 0.495 -0.016 0.232 0.177 2.999 2.540 0.014 -2.418 1.931 -0.933 7.043 15.064 18,357 
120 minutes 0.656 -0.027 0.315 0.241 3.232 2.863 0.167 -2.453 1.885 -1.172 5.960 13.424 9,180 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix (CSAD) 
 Belgium France Netherlands Portugal  
 60m 120m 60m 120m 60m 120m 60m 120m  
Belgium - - 0.791 0.837 0.472 0.567 0.474 0.535  
France 0.791 0.837 - - 0.494 0.583 0.490 0.535  
Netherlands 0.472 0.567 0.494 0.583 - - 0.325 0.414  
Portugal  0.474 0.535 0.490 0.535 0.325 0.414 - -  
Panel C: Correlation Matrix (rm,t) 
 Belgium France Netherlands Portugal  
 60m 120m 60m 120m 60m 120m 60m 120m  
Belgium - - 0.632 0.715 0.511 0.603 0.411 0.498  
France 0.632 0.715 - - 0.633 0.697 0.499 0.553  
Netherlands 0.511 0.603 0.633 0.697 - - 0.420 0.477  
Portugal  0.411 0.498 0.499 0.553 0.420 0.477 - -  
Panel D: Number of firms per country/sector 
Sector  Basic 
Materials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services 
Financials Healthcare Industrials Oil and Gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
Number of firms  85 280 294 334 97 405 32 309 25 36 
Countries Belgium France Netherlands Portugal       
Number of firms 324 1,340 161 77       
Table 1 contains information on the descriptive statistics of our database. Panel A details statistics on the mean, standard deviation, maximum values, minimum values, skewness, kurtosis and number of observations for CSAD 
and rm,t for the Euronext as a group and for each of its constituent markets for two frequencies (60-/120- minutes) for the period January 2nd 2002 – December 31st 2010. Panels B and C contain the correlation matrices for 
CSAD and rm,t for the two frequencies and the four constituent markets. Panel D includes the number of firms for each country and sector.  
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Table 2: Herding in the Euronext as a group 
 60-minute frequency 120-minute frequency 
Constant
 
0.347 0.458 
 (167.38)*** (128.32)*** 
|rm,t| 1.406 1.415 
 (56.99)*** (47.53)*** 
r2m,t -0.238 -0.214 
 (-6.54)*** (-7.38)*** 
R2 0.548 0.538 
The table presents Newey-West consistent estimates from the equation CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + et drawing upon 
the universe of listed stocks on the Euronext’s equity segment (comprised of the equity markets of Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands and Portugal). Estimations are run for two frequencies (60-/120-minutes) for the January 2002 – December 
2010 sample period. T-statistics are reported in brackets. * = significance at the 10% level; ** = significance at the 5% 
level; *** = significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Herding and the size effect in the Euronext 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Panel A: 60-minute frequency results  
Constant
 
0.162 0.317 0.348 0.328 0.290 
 (14.73)*** (68.33)*** (113.35)*** (165.22)*** (183.64)*** 
|rm,t| 1.703 1.700 1.506 1.392 0.864 
 (63.05)*** (69.48)*** (68.35)*** (65.35)*** (67.15)*** 
r2m,t -0.0119 -0.00120 0.0722 -0.156 -0.0846 
 (-6.87)*** (-0.10) (6.59)*** (-5.30)*** (-7.55)*** 
R2 0.925 0.797 0.763 0.500 0.560 
Panel B: 120-minute frequency results 
Constant
 
0.289 0.422 0.456 0.438 0.397 
 (31.33)*** (43.20)*** (94.80)*** (122.37)*** (137.07)*** 
|rm,t| 1.769 1.857 1.528 1.355 0.822 
 (72.99)*** (29.38)*** (45.53)*** (41.95)*** (45.48)*** 
r2m,t -0.00926 -0.0927 0.0342 -0.186 -0.0585 
 (-3.87)*** (-2.16)** (2.39)** (-5.13)*** (-4.70)*** 
R2 0.898 0.688 0.648 0.520 0.576 
The table presents Newey-West consistent estimates from the equation CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + et drawing upon the universe of listed stocks on the Euronext’s equity 
segment (comprised of the equity markets of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) split into five equal-sized quintiles. The quintile-construction process has followed 
the methodology proposed by Chang et al. (2000), according to which, we sort the universe of listed stocks (i.e. from all four constituent markets) each year according to their 
market capitalization at December 31st of the immediately preceding year and then split them into five equal-sized quintiles (quintile 1 is the smallest; quintile 5 the largest). 
Estimations are run for two frequencies (60-/120-minutes) for the January 2002 – December 2010 sample period for each quintile (Panels A-B). T-statistics are reported in 
brackets. * = significance at the 10% level; ** = significance at the 5% level; *** = significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: Herding and industry effects in the Euronext 
 Basic 
Materials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services 
Financials Healthcare Industrials Oil and Gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
Panel A: 60-minute frequency results 
Constant
 
0.263 0.278 0.343 0.210 0.339 0.303 0.218 0.439 0.161 0.182 
 (58.26)*** (48.53)*** (133.09)*** (72.27)*** (129.70)*** (152.80)*** (90.43)*** (120.41)*** (25.78)*** (51.70)*** 
|rm,t| 0.932 1.446 1.055 1.507 1.100 1.216 0.664 1.313 0.986 0.955 
 (20.92)*** (20.64)*** (48.46)*** (43.86)*** (52.54)*** (65.83)*** (39.96)*** (45.62)*** (27.38)*** (29.84)*** 
r2m,t 0.0933 -0.238 0.158 0.0933 -0.0851 -0.141 0.0244 0.119 0.0888 -0.0764 
 (1.76)* (-2.54)** (4.82)*** (2.68)*** (-3.48)*** (-6.02)*** (1.42) (4.91)*** (4.14)*** (-2.18)** 
R2 0.586 0.549 0.552 0.805 0.456 0.548 0.447 0.650 0.706 0.481 
Panel B: 120-minute frequency results 
Constant
 
0.355 0.380 0.451 0.274 0.476 0.406 0.284 0.587 0.245 0.229 
 (73.59)*** (89.38)*** (106.92)*** (74.89)*** (108.58)*** (110.27)*** (74.15)*** (91.67)*** (35.96)*** (47.98)*** 
|rm,t| 0.983 1.384 1.163 1.614 1.052 1.249 0.725 1.407 0.991 1.001 
 (29.73)*** (39.03)*** (52.76)*** (47.90)*** (41.19)*** (46.92)*** (39.03)*** (37.08)*** (32.07)*** (31.59)*** 
r2m,t 0.0147 -0.132 0.00443 -0.0951 -0.111 -0.149 -0.0175 -0.0474 0.0714 -0.0843 
 (0.45) (-3.23)*** (0.37) (-2.66)*** (-5.69)*** (-6.03)*** (-2.29)** (-2.12)** (4.40)*** (-3.21)*** 
R2 0.571 0.553 0.519 0.737 0.439 0.540 0.474 0.570 0.703 0.522 
The table presents Newey-West consistent estimates from the equation CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + et drawing upon the universe of listed stocks on the Euronext’s 
equity segment (comprised of the equity markets of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) split into ten industries in line with the FTSE ICB classification. 
Estimations are run for two frequencies (60-/120-minutes) for the January 2002 – December 2010 sample period for each industry (Panels A-B). T-statistics are reported in 
brackets. * = significance at the 10% level; ** = significance at the 5% level; *** = significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: Herding and country effects in the Euronext 
 Belgium  France Netherlands Portugal 
Panel A: 60-minute frequency results 
Constant
 
0.246 0.362 0.0961 0.202 
 (133.02)*** (167.88)*** (7.86)*** (73.10)*** 
|rm,t| 1.358 1.352 1.338 1.255 
 (80.19)*** (56.89)*** (41.42)*** (60.48)*** 
r2m,t -0.144 -0.197 0.261 -0.173 
 (-9.85)*** (-5.72)*** (53.28)*** (-10.62)*** 
R2 0.529 0.53 0.858 0.635 
Panel B: 120-minute frequency results 
Constant
 
0.32 0.473 0.409 0.304 
 (92.32)*** (125.21)*** (52.51)*** (60.31)*** 
|rm,t| 1.361 1.386 1.184 1.194 
 (39.12)*** (44.39)*** (28.22)*** (43.28)*** 
r2m,t -0.156 -0.19 0.112 -0.157 
 (-3.57)*** (-5.89)*** (6.22)*** (-8.75)*** 
R2 0.566 0.532 0.78 0.599 
The table presents Newey-West consistent estimates from the equation CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + et for each of Euronext’s equity markets (Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands and Portugal). Estimations are run for two frequencies (60-/120-minutes) for the January 2002 – December 2010 sample period for each country (Panels A-B). T-
statistics are reported in brackets. * = significance at the 10% level; ** = significance at the 5% level; *** = significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
Table 6: The effect of member’ trading dynamics over each market’s herding 
Market m: Belgium France Netherlands Portugal 
Control market n:  France  Netherlands  Portugal  Belgium  Netherlands  Portugal  Belgium  France  Portugal  Belgium  France  Netherlands  
Panel A: 60-minute frequency results 
Constant
 
0.247 0.246 0.246 0.359 0.361 0.349 0.262 0.260 0.294 0.201 0.201 0.201 
 (122.00)*** (131.61)*** (107.39)*** (128.23)*** (165.17)*** (158.40)*** (54.63)*** (58.74)*** (50.55)*** (71.53)*** (75.16)*** (72.50)*** 
|rm,t| 1.324 1.350 1.303 1.374 1.345 1.267 1.374 1.445 1.006 1.253 1.256 1.255 
 (62.35)*** (79.00)*** (51.70)*** (35.43)*** (55.61)*** (56.02)*** (41.65)*** (46.18)*** (17.54)*** (58.36)*** (64.10)*** (58.66)*** 
r2m,t -0.209 -0.147 -0.154 -0.319 -0.208 -0.248 0.0909 0.0796 0.128 -0.184 -0.186 -0.179 
 (-7.02)*** (-9.59)*** (-4.70)*** (-5.20)*** (-5.95)*** (-6.38)*** (7.47)*** (7.02)*** (2.49)** (-10.50)*** (-11.05)*** (-10.11)*** 
r2n,t 0.156 0.00648 0.0489 0.166 0.00998 0.0598 -0.293 -0.598 -0.0831 0.0799 0.0550 0.0106 
 (4.60)*** (5.07)*** (4.47)*** (2.52)** (5.45)*** (4.85)*** (-3.08)*** (-8.40)*** (-5.03)*** (3.16)*** (1.83)* (1.46) 
R2 0.535 0.532 0.540 0.537 0.535 0.541 0.861 0.868 0.660 0.636 0.636 0.635 
Panel B: 120-minute frequency results 
Constant
 
0.320 0.319 0.315 0.472 0.471 0.453 0.408 0.404 0.408 0.302 0.303 0.300 
 (74.17)*** (86.05)*** (74.87)*** (117.58)*** (121.92)*** (114.12)*** (53.43)*** (51.86)*** (58.01)*** (63.09)*** (63.72)*** (62.88)*** 
|rm,t| 1.344 1.345 1.312 1.362 1.362 1.283 1.234 1.279 1.074 1.186 1.194 1.191 
 (28.58)*** (34.91)*** (30.41)*** (38.06)*** (41.30)*** (37.29)*** (24.74)*** (28.12)*** (22.78)*** (47.69)*** (50.23)*** (47.81)*** 
r2m,t -0.208 -0.166 -0.166 -0.272 -0.210 -0.261 0.106 0.103 -0.0403 -0.176 -0.179 -0.179 
 (-2.80)*** (-3.33)*** (-2.85)*** (-5.82)*** (-5.83)*** (-6.52)*** (5.96)*** (6.01)*** (-1.11) (-11.26)*** (-11.97)*** (-12.02)*** 
r2n,t 0.0770 0.0128 0.0324 0.215 0.0220 0.0468 -0.300 -0.357 -0.0114 0.147 0.0987 0.0428 
 (3.04)*** (4.88)*** (3.92)*** (4.23)*** (6.73)*** (3.89)*** (-1.89)* (-5.44)*** (-0.74) (4.07)*** (3.36)*** (4.85)*** 
R2 0.569 0.571 0.593 0.541 0.541 0.535 0.784 0.790 0.588 0.603 0.601 0.602 
The table presents Newey-West consistent estimates from the equation CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + α3r2n,t + et for each of Euronext’s equity markets (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal), 
controlling for the trading dynamics of each of the other three markets (reflected here through r2n,t in the right-hand side). Estimations are run for two frequencies (60-/120-minutes) for the January 2002 – 
December 2010 sample period for each country (Panels A-B). T-statistics are reported in brackets. * = significance at the 10% level; ** = significance at the 5% level; *** = significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7: The effect of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis on herding in the Euronext as a group 
 60-minute frequency 120-minute frequency 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
Constant
 
0.312 0.417 0.376 0.417 0.533 0.510 
    (154.95)***      (95.30)***       (87.79)***     (101.47)***      (66.99)***       (70.00)*** 
|rm,t| 1.785 1.110 1.130 1.762 1.152 1.007 
      (77.64)***      (41.22)***       (28.56)***     (55.40)***      (29.72)***       (18.55)*** 
r2m,t -0.503            -0.0621 -0.295 -0.367 -0.0924 -0.151 
      (-15.20)***       (-2.89)***        (-4.81)***      (-13.35)***       (-3.50)***       (-2.26)** 
R2 0.567 0.579  0.430  0.541 0.598 0.436 
The table presents Newey-West consistent estimates from the equation CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + et drawing upon the universe of listed 
stocks on the Euronext’s equity segment (comprised of the equity markets of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal). Estimations are run 
for two frequencies (60-/120-minutes) for the following three sub periods: pre crisis (2/1/2002 – 1/6/2007); in crisis (4/6/2007 – 9/3/2009); and post 
crisis (10/3/2009 – 31/12/2010). T-statistics are reported in brackets. * = significance at the 10% level; ** = significance at the 5% level; *** = 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 8: The effect of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis on herding in Euronext’s constituent markets 
 Belgium  France Netherlands Portugal 
Panel A: 60-minute frequency results 
 Before  During  After  Before  During After Before During After Before During After 
Constant
 
0.209 0.335 0.307 0.336 0.432 0.369 0.215 0.382 0.356 0.152 0.302 0.255 
 (105.09)*** (72.09)*** (79.66)*** (161.15)*** (93.19)*** (77.91)*** (76.71)*** (71.18)*** (50.75)*** (68.30)*** (53.94)*** (49.73)*** 
|rm,t| 1.434 1.237 0.995 1.586 1.113 1.256 1.684 0.809 0.776 1.286 1.090 1.037 
 (56.70)*** (47.49)*** (29.62)*** (71.78)*** (38.94)*** (28.88)*** (171.12)*** (39.20)*** (26.50)*** (68.22)*** (49.45)*** (44.29)*** 
r2m,t -0.193 -0.103 0.0322 -0.356 -0.0556 -0.358 0.0314 -0.0209 0.411 0.0734 -0.123 -0.124 
 (-4.05)*** (-6.05)*** (0.73) (-12.16)*** (-2.37)** (-5.22)*** (12.46)***     (-1.94)*    (23.84)*** (3.55)*** (-11.00)*** (-7.67)*** 
R2 0.517 0.532 0.475 0.530 0.558 0.441 0.215 0.382 0.356 0.694 0.598 0.567 
 
 
Panel B: 120-minute frequency results 
 Before  During  After  Before  During After Before During After Before During After 
Constant
 
0.277 0.418 0.387 0.440 0.551 0.497 0.333 0.513 0.556 0.236 0.432 0.375 
 (82.49)*** (56.34)*** (60.91)*** (104.39)*** (65.88)*** (63.21)*** (54.77)*** (49.49)*** (38.71)*** (49.86)*** (40.97)*** (38.19)*** 
|rm,t| 1.500 1.223 1.011 1.626 1.168 1.172 1.588 0.863 0.611 1.272 1.008 1.015 
 (47.87)*** (32.00)*** (21.61)*** (53.81)*** (28.30)*** (20.36)*** (82.99)*** (29.02)*** (11.49)*** (36.96)*** (31.65)*** (30.71)*** 
r2m,t -0.317 -0.0645 -0.0507 -0.281 -0.0965 -0.300 0.0429 -0.0575 0.380 -0.0233 -0.0920 -0.144 
 (-8.59)*** (-2.31)** (-0.94) (-11.78)*** (-3.35)*** (-4.24)*** (7.71)*** (-4.65)*** (11.80)*** (-0.60) (-6.92)*** (-8.10)*** 
R2 0.500 0.632 0.512 0.538 0.572 0.429 0.869 0.567 0.624 0.590 0.566 0.538 
The table presents Newey-West consistent estimates from the equation CSADm,t = α0 + α1|rm,t| + α2r2m,t + et for each of Euronext’s four equity markets (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and 
Portugal). Estimations are run for two frequencies (60-/120-minutes) for the following three sub periods: pre crisis (2/1/2002 – 1/6/2007); in crisis (4/6/2007 – 9/3/2009); and post crisis 
(10/3/2009 – 31/12/2010). T-statistics are reported in brackets. * = significance at the 10% level; ** = significance at the 5% level; *** = significance at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Foreign investors’ participation in shareholding ownership in Euronext’s four constituent equity markets 
 
Figure 1 presents the percentage participation of foreign investors in the shareholding ownership in each of Euronext’s four constituent markets. Data is available for the 
2002-2007 period and was obtained from the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) Share Ownership Structure in Europe 2007 Survey. No data exists for the 
Netherlands for year 2004, hence the break in its line on that year.  
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